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Many have recently called attention to deep and extreme poverty in the U.S. This literature is notable both for suggesting extreme and deep poverty are disturbingly high, and for the tremendous variation in estimates (Jencks 2016; Parolin and Brady 2019) . In the most visible account, Edin and Shaefer (2015) claim that more than 4% of all households (HHs) with children -1.5 million HHs with 3 million children -lived on less than $2 per day in a month in 2011.
Using a more comprehensive measure of income and including all HHs, Chandy and Smith (2014) find only slightly less $2 per day poverty. With a higher threshold, Fox and colleagues (2015b) find that 5.3% -roughly 16.5 million people -was deeply poor in 2011. Deaton (2018) estimates that 3.2-5.3 million Americans have less than $4 per day per person. Philip Alston (2018) , the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, reports that 18.5 million Americans live in deep poverty. In contrast, the Heritage Foundation claims that only about 0.5% of the U.S. population is in deep poverty (Hall and Rector 2018) . Meyer and colleagues (2018) conclude that only 326,000 Americans, about 0.11% of the population, were extremely poor in 2011.
Equally important, many claim that deep/extreme poverty has increased in recent decades. Edin and Shaefer (2015: xvii) claim, "The number of families in $2-a-day poverty had more than doubled in just a decade and a half." Including means-tested programs and all households, Shaefer and Edin (2013: 260) find that the percent of HHs in this form of extreme poverty increased 36.9% between 1996 and 2011. Several contend that increases in deep/extreme poverty resulted from the 1996 welfare reform and related social policy changes (Danziger 2010 ). Shaefer and colleagues (2015) find that $2 per day (henceforth "$2/day") poverty is much less common if HHs receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Because TANF receipt has declined (Danziger 2010; Moffitt 2015; Parolin 2019b) , Edin and Shaefer (2015) poor people. Shaefer and Edin (2013) have only 256 households in extreme poverty in the first wave and 392 in the last wave. Meyer and colleagues (2018) have only 70 individuals in extreme poverty. Because rates of deep/extreme poverty are very low with any measure, a larger sample reduces the impact of measurement error and facilitates obtaining more reliable estimates. This is particularly true when disaggregating extreme poverty trends by household type or other demographic characteristic. Also, more efficient estimates improve assessments of over-time change. Relatedly, most previous estimates do not report confidence intervals.
Second, the CPS measures income over an entire year while the SIPP measures income on a quarterly basis. Shaefer and Edin (2013: 256) acknowledge the short-time horizon is "an important limitation", are constrained by the SIPP weights, and conduct sensitivity analyses on a quarterly basis. Meyer and colleagues (2018) also use the SIPP to average income over 4 months. Still, Shaefer and Edin (2013: 261) find, "Fewer households experience extreme poverty for a calendar quarter when compared to a month." While some argue that short time periods enable observation of extreme deprivation (e.g. Morduch and Schneider 2017) or better reflect an HH's ability to cope with emergency expenses (e.g. Chen 2019), the annual time frame better captures more permanent economic resources and well-being (Brady et al. 2018 ). HH incomes smooth over time, short-term deprivation is more dependent on assets than just income, and longer-term HH income is higher and more equally distributed (Brady et al. 2018) . As Meyer and colleagues (2018: 29) write, "Most of the literature on income and well-being has argued for looking over a full year given transitory fluctuations in income that may not be reflected in consumption or other outcomes."
There are other advantages of the CPS over the SIPP when investigating deep/extreme poverty. As Winship (2016) notes, many of the perceived benefits of the SIPP have faded over time: (a) imputation of transfers in the SIPP now matches or exceeds that of the CPS; (b) survey nonresponse has increased at a much faster rate in the SIPP than it has in the CPS; and (c) the representativeness of SIPP samples declines over time, particularly when the SIPP is used for cross-sectional estimates (as in Meyer et al., 2018) . Relative to the SIPP, Meyer and colleagues (2018) find the CPS has fewer inconsistencies between reported earnings and reported hours working, including a much smaller share of HH's reporting zero earnings but positive reported hours worked (see fn. 2).
All analyses use weights to make the estimates representative of the U.S. population. We include all individuals in our primary analyses (Fox et al. 2015b; Meyer et al. 2018) . We then decompose trends in deep/extreme poverty by household type, focusing on individuals in households with children (the focus of Shaefer and Edin [2013] ) compared to individuals in households without children. Roughly half the U.S. population lives in either household type in 2016. The individual is the unit of analysis and we estimate the proportion of individuals who reside in deep or extremely poor households. This differs from Shaefer and Edin (2013) , who mainly treat HHs as the unit of analysis and report the raw number and percent of HHs who are extremely poor. 1 For samples sizes, see Appendix I.
It is important to acknowledge that the CPS does not capture many of the most severely disadvantaged people (e.g. the homeless) or those residing in institutions such as prisons or military bases (Fox et al. 2015b) . Therefore, our estimates could be lower-bound estimates and actual levels of deep/extreme poverty could be higher. As a result, below we estimate deep/extreme poverty after adding the national homelessness point in time counts (Corporation for National and Community Service 2018).
THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME
In the 1990s, the United Nations convened "The Canberra Group" to identify best practices in income measurement (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2011). As a result, a consensus emerged on how to measure income (Brady 2009; Brady et al. 2013; Brady and Burton 2016; Brady et al. 2018; Duncan and Petersen 2001; Parolin and Brady 2019; Rainwater and Smeeding 2003; Smeeding 2016; Smeeding and Weinberg 2001) . Among the leading international standards, measures of income should be: (1) as comprehensive as possible incorporating taxes and transfers (i.e. be "post-fisc"); and (2) equivalized for HH size. People live, consume, manage volatility, and maintain well-being by sharing expenses and resources with others in HHs, by accessing transfers, and based on disposable income after taxes and transfers (Bitler and Hoynes 2016; Brady et al. 2018; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Hoynes et al. 2016; Shaefer and Gutierrez 2013) .
Incorporating Taxes and Transfers
Shaefer and Edin's "headline results" -in the 2013 article abstract, in the 2015 book, and in the media -are based on cash income only. As others note (Meyer et al. 2018; Winship 2016) , their measure omits near-cash transfers (e.g. the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP], housing vouchers, rent and heating subsidies) and taxes and tax credits (e.g. the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC]). Edin and Shaefer (2015: xviii) argue that including SNAP would be, "A problematic assumption because SNAP cannot legally be converted to cash, so it can't be used to pay the light bill, the rent, or buy a bus pass." On balance, Shaefer and Edin's (2013) report some results with alternative income definitions and note the increase is more modest with these alternatives. For instance, including welfare transfers and tax credits, Shaefer and Edin (2013: 256) conclude that only 1.6% of HHs with children were extremely poor -less than half of their estimate of more than 4% of HHs with children.
By contrast, we contend it is essential to incorporate SNAP, the EITC, and any taxes and transfers (Brady 2009; Citro and Michael 1996; Ziliak 2006; Moffitt and Scholz 2009) . Much evidence shows SNAP plays a crucial role in smoothing and stabilizing the consumption of lowincome HHs (e.g. Gundersen and Ziliak 2003) . SNAP and other transfers are also essential to families' ability to offset the turbulence of economic recessions (Bitler and Hoynes 2016), and access to SNAP significantly improves short and long-term well-being ). Shaefer and Gutierrez (2013) find SNAP significantly reduces both HH food insecurity and nonfood material hardships. Since the 1990s, the EITC has grown into the largest social assistance programs for families with children in the U.S. and SNAP receipt has grown substantially (Danziger 2010; Moffitt 2015; Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding 2016) . In turn, overtime trends are likely biased by the omission of these programs (also see Appendix V).
A few in this literature incorporate taxes and transfers (Chandy and Smith 2014; Fox et al. 2015b ). However, the key limitation of most is the use of survey data that systematically underreports the receipt of welfare transfers. As even Edin acknowledge (2013, 2018) , there is convincing evidence that the incomes and welfare transfers of low-income HHs are underreported in most HH surveys Meyer et al. 2018; Meyer and Mittag 2015; Winship 2016). 2 We improve on the income definitions applied in prior studies in several ways. First, we follow leading international standards and employ the Luxembourg Income Study's (LIS, 2017) income measurement framework to construct different measures of household income. We begin with cash income, which includes labor market earnings, plus income from Social Security, TANF, General Assistance, Unemployment Insurance, retirement, interest, dividends, rent, Workers Compensation, veterans' benefits, survivors' assistance, disability assistance, education assistance, alimony, child support, and other sources not specified.
Second, we address undercounting of means-tested welfare transfers such as SNAP and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) by employing the Urban Institute's (2017) TRIM3 program Parolin 2019a; Shaefer and Edin 2018) . TRIM3 matches administrative records on TANF/SNAP caseloads across states to impute benefits back into the survey data. Whereas the uncorrected CPS survey data misses about half of TANF/SNAP cash transfers (Meyer and Mittag 2015) , the augmented data comes much closer to capturing the full amount of cash assistance identified in administrative data. 3 The first year that the TRIM3 model is available is 1993 and the last year is 2016. This explains our temporal scope.
Third, most analyses include TRIM3-corrected SNAP benefits. In some analyses, we only add 50% of the SNAP benefits because Edin and Shaefer (2015) argue SNAP benefits are not as liquid and useful as cash benefits. Nevertheless, we doubt SNAP has zero value and monetize SNAP at 50 cents on the dollar as a lower bound of the actual cash value of SNAP. This is consistent with Edin and Shaefer's (2015) estimates of the underground exchange rate at 50-60 cents on the dollar. This is more conservative than the estimates of Whitmore (2002) , who finds that recipients value food stamps at roughly 80 percent of their value. By reporting results with 50% and 100% of SNAP, we show a lower and upper bound of the value of SNAP.
Finally, we apply the LIS measure of disposable household income to incorporate tax liabilities, tax credits (EITC, CTC, ACTC), temporary benefits (stimulus credit, Make Work Pay tax credit), housing allowances, energy assistance (LIHEAP), and the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) programs. 4 By incorporating taxes, we differ from Meyer and colleagues (2018) , who only include the EITC and omit other tax credits and liabilities. We use the Census simulations to subtract taxes from and add tax credits to HH income. 5 This definition is disposable "post-fisc" (i.e. after taxes and transfers) HH income, and is widely viewed as high quality (Brady 2009; Brady et al. 2013; Rainwater and Smeeding 2003; Smeeding 2016) .
Unlike Meyer et al. (2018) , we do not incorporate assets or real estate equity into our definition of household income, though we do include income from dividends and rents. We also do not monetize the value of health benefits (Winship 2016) . If a household has a level of disposable income small enough to qualify as living in deep/extreme poverty, but has access to health insurance, we maintain that the household is still deeply/extremely poor. 4 We improve on the LIS protocol by including state EITCs, which are not included by the LIS. However, we acknowledge the CPS assumes full take-up of the EITC and ACTC, whereas the actual take-up rate is estimated around 80 percent of eligible earners (Jones 2014). Housing allowances are measured in the CPS as the value of federal housing assistance received by members of a family as estimated using matched administrative data. 5 The Census tax simulation appears to over-correct at times. In 1993-1994, the simulation recodes some high gross income households into low incomes. In 1993, for example, 415 individuals in the CPS have zero disposable income (i.e. their tax liability exceeds their gross incomes), but have gross income of $100,000+. There are only 10 such individuals in the 1995 sample. Although 415 is a small share of the 1993 sample of 150,943, this could bias the very low estimates of extreme poverty. Therefore, we imposed a decision rule that if gross income was above the median, we do not code these households as deeply or extremely poor regardless of the tax simulation.
Finally, Meyer et al. (2018) also adjust the wages of self-employed workers to be the higher value of the reported wage or the reported number of hours worked multiplied by the minimum wage. This adjustment assumes that hours worked are reported accurately, but selfemployment earnings are not, and that self-employed individuals do, indeed, receive earnings at the minimum wage level of higher. In contrast, Bollinger (1998) , Hoyakem and colleagues (2015) , and Bollinger and colleagues (2014) demonstrate that over-reporting of earnings, rather than underreporting, is a much larger concern at the bottom of the income distribution.
Nonetheless, a sensitivity analysis in Appendix VI mimics Meyer and colleagues' (2018) strategy for adjusting wages. For any survey respondent who recorded no earned income but at least one hour "usually worked," we replace the earnings value with the product of the reported hours "usually worked" per week and the minimum wage in the respondent's state-year. We then recalculate poverty rates. Even with this wage imputation, our primary findings hold. 6
Adjusting for Household Size
HHs have economies of scale such that there is a declining cost to an additional person.
Several adjustments for HH size are available. The literature suggests that it is less consequential which equivalence scale one uses, but it is essential to use an equivalence scale (Brady et al. 2018; Rainwater and Smeeding 2003) . We equivalize income for HH size by dividing by the square root of HH members. 7 By contrast, Shaefer and Edin's (2013) main results do not adjust for HH size (also Meyer et al. 2018: 12) . The World Bank's metric of $2-a-day that they apply assumes there are zero economies of scale as each additional HH member requires a proportional and linear increase in resources. 8 Shaefer and Edin (2013: 261 ) also note results with our equivalence scale. Doing so, they find a lower level of extreme poverty, but a similar increase.
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POVERTY
We define poverty with the classic, simple conceptualization of a shortage of resources compared to needs (Smeeding 2016) . Following the discussion of income measurement, resources should be measured as comprehensively as possible. This simple definition clarifies that poverty is always based on some standard of needs. We make this transparent to emphasize that none of the literature defines the standard of needs in an objective and scientific way. All are at least somewhat arbitrary.
We acknowledge the temptation to think of deep/extreme poverty in absolute terms. Such an image of absolute deprivation is certainly present in debates on deep/extreme poverty (Alston 2018; Deaton 2018; Edin and Shaefer 2015; Meyer et al. 2018) . To the best of our knowledge, however, no physiological data, caloric requirements, or objective budget of basic necessities has been linked to a standard of needs employed in deep/extreme poverty measures. Despite common impressions, the U.S. official poverty measure (OPM) is not actually based on an objective standard of needs and has many problems undermining its reliability and validity. For brevity, we detail the problems with the OPM in Appendix II.
The fact that there is no absolute standard of needs in the deep/extreme poverty literature is one of the major reasons that international poverty scholars overwhelmingly use relative 8 To the best of our knowledge, the World Bank never justified this measure's zero economies of scale. Indeed, there was never much scientific basis for the $2-a-day threshold even in developing countries (Smeeding 2016 ). It appears to have always been a politically constructed measure that was not based on any scientific absolute measure of deprivation.
measures (Brady et al. 2013; Brady and Burton 2016) . A relative measure defines poverty as a shortage of resources relative to needs defined by the prevailing standards of a given time and place. Relative measures better predict well-being, health, and life chances; are more valid for leading conceptualizations of poverty (e.g. capability deprivation and social exclusion); are more reliable for over-time and cross-place comparisons; and are justified because of the absence of defensible absolute alternatives with fewer problems (Brady 2009; Fox et al. 2015a Fox et al. , 2015b Rainwater and Smeeding 2003; Smeeding 2016) . Therefore, we apply a relative measure of poverty in our primary analyses. To say individuals are in "deep" or "extreme" poverty simply means the gap between resources and needs is deeper or more extreme.
THRESHOLDS FOR DEEP/EXTREME POVERTY
For transparency about the concrete dollar amounts needed for the various poverty thresholds, we report the real dollar amounts in Appendix I. Also, Appendix I reports how these thresholds translate to real gross domestic product per capita. It is unfortunately common for scholars to not report the thresholds, however doing so is essential for readers to assess poverty rates. Appendix I lists the national poverty thresholds for each year (state-specific poverty thresholds available upon request). Our view is that there are several defensible thresholds and we aim for general conclusions across thresholds.
We employ both relative and anchored poverty thresholds (Brady et al. 2013; Smeeding 2016) . We set the poverty threshold for our relative deep/extreme poverty measures based on a percentage of the median in each year for the entire U.S. To account for the meaningful differences in the cost of living and standards of needs across the U.S., we also present a measure of deep/extreme poverty based on the median in each state in each year. Because the CPS is not necessarily large per state-year, we pool three years (t-1, t, and t+1) for each state to estimate the median. The advantage of state-specific thresholds is an even more precise definition of relative poverty that incorporates more local living standards, costs, and needs. We acknowledge, however, that differences in costs of living may also represent geographical differences in amenities, productivity levels, and wages.
To assess poverty at the same threshold over time, we also present measures using anchored poverty measures (Brady et al. 2013) . Anchored measures adjust HH income for inflation with the PCE deflator, and fix the threshold to one time point (Smeeding 2016) . 9 While a relative measure may be less sensitive to the business cycle and economic development (or, as in the 2008 recession, overly sensitive; see Appendices II-III), an anchored measure is responsive (Brady et al. 2013) .
We draw an explicit distinction that is often implicit between the more moderate "deep" poverty and the much worse "extreme" poverty. To measure deep poverty, we employ three thresholds. First, we estimate the proportion with less than 20% of the national median in each year. 10 Second, we estimate the proportion of the population with less than 20% of the median in 9 Trends in our anchored poverty measures are comparable if we apply the CPI-U or CPI-U-RS deflators rather than the PCE. We use the PCE in our primary analysis as it is the most conservative. Thus, if anchored poverty increases with the PCE, it will (and does) also increase with the other two deflators. There are concerns that the CPI-U overstates inflation relative to the PCE (Winship 2016) , but that dispute remains unsettled, as the consumption patterns of lowincome households may not be well reflected in the PCE indicator. Our relative measures of poverty are, of course, not affected by choice of income deflator. each state and year. Third, we estimate the proportion with less than 20% of the inflation adjusted 1993 national median. To measure extreme poverty, we again employ three thresholds.
We estimate the proportion with less than 10% of the national median in each year, 10% of the median in each state-year, and 10% of the inflation adjusted 1993 national median.
Again, we are transparent and explicit that there is no objective scientific justification for thresholds of deep poverty at 20% of the median and extreme poverty at 10% of the median. One could define deep poverty at 25% of the median and extreme poverty at 5% or 15%. 11 For comparison, we also report trends at 30% and 50% of medians (see Appendices II-III).
As Appendix I shows, even at our highest national threshold (20% of median), being deeply poor implies a very low income. To be deeply poor in 2016, an individual had less than $7,285 annually or $607 per month in 2017 dollars. To facilitate replication, we provide Stata code for augmenting the CPS data, and for calculating thresholds and poverty rates (see Appendices V and VIII; Parolin 2019a; Parolin and Brady 2019).
Our approach for extreme poverty differs with Shaefer and Edin's (2013) thresholds of $2/day. Their threshold is "absolute" in that it defines extreme poverty according to a predetermined threshold of basic needs regardless of time and place. For example, their threshold for a family of three would be $2,190 (i.e. $2*3*365) in 2015, or $2,323 in 2017 dollars. This is much lower than our thresholds for extreme poverty. In 2016, for a family of three, 10% of the national equivalized median would be $6,309 in 2017 USD. Below, we replicate their estimates alongside a series of alternatives that improve on their measures in steps. With each improvement, it becomes clear how the results differ from Shaefer and Edin (2013) .
We also acknowledge that some measure deep poverty at of 50% of the OPM (Alston 2018) . As explained in Appendix II, the problems with the OPM are so significant that we lack confidence in such measures. As well, some define deep poverty as a percentage of the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) threshold (e.g. Fox et al. 2015a Fox et al. , 2015b Iceland 2005) . In sensitivity checks, we replicate our results using deep/extreme poverty thresholds derived from the Historical SPM data from Fox and colleagues (2015a) . Specifically, we measure the share of the population living below 30% of the SPM threshold (roughly 22% of median income for the average person in 2015), and 20% of the SPM threshold (15% of median income for the average person in 2015). The trends in poverty using the SPM are quite consistent with our findings. We display the trends in the measures based on the SPM in Appendix VII. Figure 1 shows the trends in deep poverty. We present annual estimates and 95% confidence intervals on those estimates. In all figures, the confidence intervals are fairly small, partly because the CPS provides a large sample. As a result, over-time comparisons can be made as the differences tend to be statistically significant.
LEVELS AND TRENDS IN DEEP POVERTY
In 2016, we estimate that 7.2 million (2.23% of the U.S. population) were deeply poor at 20% of the national median, 7 million (2.17%) were deeply poor at 20% of state medians, and 5.2 million (1.6%) were deeply poor at 20% of the 1993 national median. 12 All three measures show substantial over-time variation. There were notable declines in deep poverty especially 1993 -1996 , 2006 -2015 . For all three measures, 1995 1996 exhibited the lowest rates of deep poverty and 2014 or 2016 exhibited the highest rates. 13 While the over-time trend is not quite as stark comparing 1993 to 2016, all three measures show a significant increase in deep poverty since 1995.
In 1993, deep poverty measured as 20% of the U.S. median was 1.5%. This measure of deep poverty fell to 1.2% in 1995-1996 and then rose to hover near 2.0% in the 2000s. However, it increased to 2.18% in 2014 and 2.23% in 2016. From 1993 to 2016, deep poverty at 20% of the national median increased by 50%. From its low point in 1995-1996 to 2016, this measure of deep poverty increased by 83%. We find a similar trend with deep poverty measured at 20% of each state's median. This measure of deep poverty declined from 1.4% in 1993 to 1.1% in 1995, and reached 2.2% by 2016. Overall, deep poverty at 20% of state medians increased 60% from 1993-2016 and 93% from 1995-2016. The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows the trend in deep poverty anchored by the 1993 U.S. median. Of the three measures of deep poverty, this measure should be least likely to show an increase as it should decline due to over-time increases in economic development. According to this anchored measure, about 1.5% were deeply poor in 1993. This rate fell to 1.1% in 1995-1996, and then rose steadily to 1.8% in 2014, before declining to 1.6% in 2016. From 1993 to 2015, anchored deep poverty increased about 9%. However, this conceals that the U.S. made some progress in reducing anchored deep poverty 1993-1996. From its low point in [1995] [1996] to 2015, anchored deep poverty increased 48%.
Thus, even with a measure anchored in 1993, there was a significant increase in deep poverty. The increase in anchored deep poverty is even more striking as there was a decline in anchored poverty at 30% and 50% of the median (see Appendices III-IV). The declines in anchored poverty at 30% and 50% of the median should build confidence in the validity and reliability of our measures of income, and suggest that any increases at 10% and 20% are not simply artefacts of income measurement. deep poverty (relative to 20% of federal median) for either household type. We see that much of the reason for the rise in deep poverty in the U.S. is due to the increase among individuals in childless households. From 1993-2016, deep poverty rises from 1.67% to 2.81% (a 68% increase) for childless households. For individuals in households with children, the rise is much smaller: an increase from 1.35% to 1.65%, or a 23% increase.
Differences in the trends of the anchored thresholds (right panel) are even more pronounced. Individuals in households with children actually see a decline in deep poverty measured with the anchored threshold (1.35% to 0.99%, 1993-2016). However, individuals in childless households see a rise from 1.67% to 2.24%. The rise in anchored deep poverty for the total population, as displayed in Figure 1 , thus appears to be primarily due to the rise in anchored deep poverty among households without children. Figure 3 shows the trends in extreme poverty. In 2016, 3.7 million (1.15%) were below 10% of the national median, 3.5 million (1.08%) were below 10% of state medians, and 2.6 million (0.81%) were below 10% of the 1993 national median.
LEVELS AND TRENDS IN EXTREME POVERTY
All three measures show over-time fluctuation, with high points in 1998, 2007, 2014, and 2016, and with low points in 1995, 1999, and 2010 . Compared to deep poverty, there is even more temporal fluctuation. Still, there are statistically significant increases from 1993 to 2016 and from the low points in 1995 to high points in 2016.
Measuring extreme poverty at 10% of the national medians, 0.66% of the U.S. was below the threshold in 1993. This rate fell to a low of 0.54% in 1995, and then rose to a high of 1.15% in 2016. At 10% of the national medians, extreme poverty increased 73% from 1993-2016, and increased 111% from 1995-2016.
In 1993, 0.65% of the U.S. population was below 10% of each state's median. Statespecific extreme poverty declined to a low of 0.52% in 1995 and then rose to 1.08% in 2016.
Thus, extreme poverty at 10% of state medians increased 65% from 1993-2016 and 107% from 1995-2015. Anchoring extreme poverty at 10% of the 1993 national median, the over-time trend is less pronounced than with the two relative measures. This measure declined from 0.66% in 1993 to 0.53% in 1995. It then rose to 0.89% in 2014 and 0.81% in 2016. Still, this measure increased 22% over the entire period and 54% from 1995-2016. 
THE EFFECT OF INCOME MEASUREMENT AND SNAP ON DEEP AND EXTREME POVERTY
We argue that income measurement is essential to measuring deep/extreme poverty. One of the main reasons our estimates differ from prior research is that we utilize a more complete measure of income. Although our measure of disposable income includes all taxes and transfers, decomposing poverty trends by income concept shows that the inclusion of SNAP benefits, in particular, is critical in shaping levels and trends of poverty (Parolin and Brady 2019) . To demonstrate this, we display two sets of results in Figures 5 and 6 . Both demonstrate how incomplete measures of income bias estimates of and trends in extreme poverty. Adding 100% of SNAP benefits to TRIM-adjusted cash income in the middle right panel, extreme poverty would be 0.92%. Finally, we show in the bottom panel that anchored extreme poverty would fall from 0.92% to 0.81% once we include tax liabilities, tax credits (EITC, CTC, ACTC), temporary benefits (stimulus credit, Make Work Pay tax credit), housing allowances, energy assistance (LIHEAP), and the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) programs. Hence, moving from a cash-only income definition to one that also includes SNAP results in a reduced estimate of anchored extreme poverty from 1.95% to 0.92% (i.e. 53% lower). After SNAP is included, adding in all other taxes and transfers only leads to an additional decline of 0.11 percentage points (i.e. 12% lower). Their threshold of $2/day and does not equivalize income for household size. Their measure results in an estimate of extreme poverty of 1.6% or 5.2 million people. Their measure increased 96% from 1993 to 2016, and 128% from its low in 1996 to its peak in 2014. million. With this measure, $2/day poverty increased 16% from 1993 to 2016 and 82% from its low in 1996 to its peak in 2014. 15 For both the levels and changes over time, the inclusion of SNAP proves to be critical in assessing $2/day poverty. Moving from counting SNAP benefits at just 50% of their value to including all other taxes and transfers leads to no statistically significant difference in the level of $2/day poverty.
We can again decompose the trends by households with and without children. Given that households with children are the primary target of SNAP benefits, and that SNAP benefits play a large role in reducing deep/extreme poverty, we might expect that the inclusion of SNAP into measurement of household income matters far more for households with children compared to those without (Parolin and Brady 2019) . Figure 7 shows trends in deep poverty (20% of federal median) by household type and income definition. The left panel shows the trends for households with children. The top line shows trends in deep poverty when only cash income (pre-TRIM3) is measured, while the second line from the top shows trends when TANF and SSI are adjusted with TRIM3. The difference between the two estimates of deep poverty in 2016 is 0.68 percentage points. 15 We encourage some caution about the over-time increase in $2/day poverty. The upper bound confidence interval in 1993 and the lower bound confidence interval in 2016 are both .41. Finally, Figure 8 shows the same patterns for extreme poverty (10% of national median).
Again, the effect of taxes and transfers, and SNAP in particular, is far greater for individuals living in households with children (left panel). Adjusting for benefit underreporting in TANF and SSI contributes to a 0.77 percentage point (26%) reduction in extreme poverty among individuals in households with children. Adding SNAP into that income definition then leads to a 1.6 percentage point (71%) reduction. Moreover, adding SNAP changes the direction of the trend. If SNAP is excluded, there is an increase in extreme poverty among households with children from 1993 to 2016. When SNAP is included, however, there is a decline in extreme poverty over time.
The different levels of extreme poverty around 2009-2010 also emphasize the importance of SNAP. When the recession hit in 2008-2009, extreme poverty measured before the addition of SNAP benefits increased sharply. This is clear in the upward spikes of the top two lines in Figure   8 during these years. In 2009, however, eligibility for SNAP and the program's maximum benefit levels were increased as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Shahin 2009 ). Accordingly, including SNAP into the income definition results in a decrease in the level of extreme poverty in 2009-2010 rather than the sharp increase observed in the pre-SNAP income definitions. In most years, the difference between the cash income + SNAP and disposable income measures of resources do not produce statistically significant differences in levels of extreme poverty. This is true for the childless households (right panel), as well. We emphasize that these findings are not just a matter of the order in which benefits are added into the income definition. If we take our definition of disposable household income and remove SNAP benefits, for example, the extreme poverty rate among children increases from 0.5% to 1.5% in 2016. Moreover, the trend in extreme poverty using this income definition increases between 1993 and 2016, in contrast to our measures that include SNAP. That SNAP benefits play a substantial role in reducing deep/extreme poverty is consistent with Parolin and Brady (2019) , who find that the rise of SNAP take-up has been instrumental toward reducing extreme child poverty after the 1996/1997 welfare reform.
HOMELESSNESS & EXTREME POVERTY
The CPS does not include the homeless, which could be a salient segment of the extremely poor in the U.S. As a result, we propose that our estimates of extreme poverty are probably lower-bounds. 16 The national point in time estimates suggest that 549,928 were homeless in the U.S. in 2016. The point in time estimates are only available since 2007, and the average annual (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) point in time estimate of homeless was 608,114. We conjecture that the homeless are likely to be extremely poor. In turn, estimates of extreme poverty that are far below the counts of homelessness raise questions about face validity (Hall and Rector 2018; Meyer et al. 2018) . Moreover, it is worthwhile to estimate how much larger the extreme poverty would be if the homeless were added to our estimates. Figure 9 shows the trends 2007-2016 in extreme poverty with and without each year's count of homelessness.
Extreme poverty would be much higher in every year if the homeless are added. For example, anchored extreme poverty in 2016 would be 1.05% of the U.S. population instead of our estimate of 0.81%. Unfortunately, the homelessness point in time estimates do not include confidence intervals so we cannot say if there are statistically significant differences between our estimates with and without homelessness. Taking the estimates as they stand, extreme poverty would have been 19-23% higher in 2016 and an average of 20-24% higher 2007-2016. Though not shown, deep poverty would have been 7-8% higher in 2016 and 9-11% higher 2007-2016 if the homeless were added. This provides evidence to reasonably suggest that estimates of 16 Of course, there are other ways our estimates could be undercounts. For example, the poor consume a much higher share of their income than the non-poor, and therefore sales taxes exert a greater cost on the poor. It would be very difficult to estimate what share of the poor's income is subject to sales tax and subtract state-and local-specific sales tax rates from that share of income. One would also need to apply such corrections to median HH income as this would affect the thresholds. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that sales taxes disproportionally lower the poor's income relative to the median HH.
deep/extreme poverty that solely use the CPS (or any household-based survey) are probably lower-bound estimates. Children in foster care institutions (not yet placed into households) and the incarcerated population are also excluded from the CPS. In contrast to the homeless, however, we are less comfortable assuming that most individuals in foster care institutions or prison are or would be extremely poor. More than 2.3 million people were incarcerated in 2013 (Glaze and Kaeble, 2014) , and more than 50,000 children were living in group homes or foster care institutions in 2017 (Children's Bureau, 2018) . Including these individuals into our poverty count would again reinforce our conclusion that the CPS can only provide a lower-bound estimate of deep or extreme poverty in the U.S.
CONCLUSION
This study presents levels and trends 1993-2016 in deep/extreme poverty in the U.S. We use uniquely augmented CPS data to adjust for benefit underreporting and construct measures of income that more comprehensively incorporate taxes and transfers. We report several measures of poverty, although even the highest thresholds presume a very low level of income. In 2016, we estimate 5.2 to 7.2 million Americans (1.6-2.2%) were deeply poor and 2.6 to 3.7 million (.8-1.2%) were extremely poor. Our evidence suggests that there has been an increase in deep/extreme poverty in the U.S. in recent decades. From low points in 1995 to 2016, deep poverty increased by an estimated 48-93% and extreme poverty increased by an estimated 54-111%. We find significant increases in deep/extreme poverty even with thresholds anchored in 1993. Contrary to prior research focused on deep/extreme child poverty, the increases appear to be concentrated among individuals living in households without children. For individuals in households with children, a rise in the receipt of SNAP benefits appears to have contributed to a decrease in extreme poverty over time (Parolin and Brady 2019) .
Advancing beyond prior research, we demonstrate that it is essential for studies of deep/extreme poverty to incorporate leading international standards of income measurement. We show the value of measuring income comprehensively, of correcting for the underreporting of taxes and transfers, and of equivalizing for household size. We also examine a variety of thresholds and make several unique adjustments. In turn, we propose that our estimates of deep/extreme poverty are more credible than prior alternatives. Moreover, this study provides methodological guidance and as an example for broader literatures on income and poverty (see also Brady et al. 2018; Parolin 2019a) .
Our analyses can inform debates about the 1996 welfare reform (Parolin 2019b ). On one hand, we find significant increases in deep/extreme poverty after welfare reform. At the same time, we do not find an increase at 30% or 50% of the median (see Appendices II-III). These results are consistent with claims that welfare reform shifted the poor towards deeper and more extreme poverty. On the other hand, our data reveal an increase in deep/extreme poverty for households without children and a decline for children and households with children. From -1995, 31 .6% of the extremely poor (<10% of U.S. median) and 44.6% of the deeply poor (<20% of U.S. median) were households with children. By contrast, in 2014-2016, only 16.4% of the extremely poor and 34% of the deeply poor were households with children. 17 From 1993 17 From -1995 17 From to 2014 17 From -2016 , children as a share of those in deep poverty declined from 23.9% to 18.2% and in extreme poverty from 16.5% to 7.7%. These patterns contradict claims that welfare reform resulted in a greater concentration of children in deep/extreme poverty. Further, our results suggest it is changes to SNAP not changes to TANF that have most shaped deep/extreme poverty in recent years. The exclusion of childless HHs from SNAP is a key source of deep/extreme poverty, and the access of HHs with children to SNAP has reduced deep/extreme poverty (Parolin and Brady 2019) .
1993
We conclude by juxtaposing the levels and increases in deep/extreme poverty against the nation's high and rising GDP per capita (WDI 2018). In 2016, the U.S. GDP per capita in 17 In 1993 17 In -1995 .1% of the extremely poor and 54.6% of the deeply poor were households without children. From 2014-2016, 81.8% of the extremely poor and 64.5% of the deeply poor were households without children. The concentration of deep/extreme poverty on non-children would likely be even clearer if we include the homeless. In recent national point in time reports, individuals without families have grown to be more than 2/3rds of the homeless.
purchasing power parity was about $59,000 (in 2017 dollars). As the highest threshold for deep poverty was about 12.4 percent of GDP per capita in 2016 (see Appendix I), it seems plausible that income redistribution could substantially reduce deep/extreme poverty. Moreover, real GDP per capita increased over 41% from 1993 41% from to 2016 41% from (WDI 2018 . Given this rising economic affluence, it would be reasonable to have expected extreme poverty anchored in 1993 to have mechanically declined. That deep/extreme poverty increased as much as they did during a period where the nation was growing much richer is arguably the most important trend.
Appendix II. Summary of Problems with Official U.S. Measure of Poverty (OPM).
We encourage skepticism of any estimates based on the OPM. The OPM has serious validity and reliability problems that have been well-documented (e.g. Brady 2009; Brady et al. 2013; Fox et al. 2015a Fox et al. , 2015b Iceland 2005; Katz 1989; O'Connor 2001; Rainwater and Smeeding 2003; Smeeding 2016) . In fact, the impetus for the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) was the widespread knowledge of the deep limitations of the OPM (Fox et al. 2015a (Fox et al. , 2015b Iceland 2005; Wimer et al. 2017) .
A careful study of the historical research shows that the OPM was problematic from the beginning. The OPM is often attributed to Orshansky. However, because problems with the OPM were known soon after its implementation, Orshansky herself disavowed the OPM only a few years after it was adopted (Brady 2009; O'Connor 2001) . O'Connor (2001: 184) explains, "No one was more surprised, though, than Orshansky herself, who had never meant her measures as official government standards. Concerned primarily with suggesting a way to vary the measure for family size, Orshansky took pains to recognize that her work was at best an 'interim standard,' 'arbitrary, but not unreasonable,' and minimalistic at best." Katz (1989: 116) quotes Orshansky as writing, "'The best that can be said of the measure,' she wrote, 'is that at a time when seemed useful, it was there.'"
We elaborate on two major problems that are particularly relevant to this study. In addition, unlike the SPM and our measures based on state-year medians, the OPM is held constant across the entire U.S., which further undermines reliability.
1) The Standard of Needs and Threshold Despite popular impressions, the standard of needs underlying the OPM does not actually have a clear scientific basis (Brady 2009; Katz 1989; O'Connor 2001) . There was never much scientific basis for multiplying food times three. Using data from the mid-1950s, there was evidence that food amounted to roughly one-third of expenses for typical households on average. The evidence was not clear that this applied to low-income households. Further, the Johnson administration ended up using the "economy food plan", which was about 25% below the "low-cost food budget" used by Orshansky (Katz 1989) . The economy food plan was meant for emergencies and on a temporary basis. Also, the food budgets were not subsequently revised. A few years later, the government began updating the OPM thresholds using the consumer price index rather than calibrating the thresholds according to changing food budgets. This had the consequence of severing any tie to the food budget as a standard of needs. Indeed, Katz (1989: 116) quotes Orshansky as writing: "This meant, of course, that the food-income relationship which was the basis for the original poverty measure no longer was the current rationale." Moreover, and as is well known, food is certainly much less than 1/3 rd of HH expenses today. As a result, the OPM effectively ignores the costs of important household needs like childcare and healthcare, which were less essential or much cheaper when the OPM was created.
2) The Definition of Income
The definition of income used in the OPM ignores taxes, tax credits (e.g. the EITC), and near-cash transfers (e.g. SNAP) that we include. As noted above, the EITC and SNAP have grown substantially in recent decades and far more receive either the EITC or SNAP than TANF (Danziger 2010; Moffitt 2015) . Also, while the OPM includes Social Security transfers (e.g. Old Age Survivors Insurance and Unemployment Insurance), it ignores childcare vouchers, housing subsidies, any state taxes, and state and federal payroll taxes. Comparisons over time, across states, and between age groups are therefore quite problematic. As our more comprehensive measure of income incorporates all taxes and transfers, it is inappropriate to for us to utilize the OPM threshold with our income definition. For comparison, 50% of the OPM in 2015 would range from $5,555 (for a single adult) to $11,445 (for a family of four with two children) in 2018 real dollars. This translates to thresholds of $5,555 -$5,722 in equivalized HH income. That the OPM deep poverty thresholds in equivalized HH income differ depending on whether there are one or three people in the HH also illustrates how the OPM equivalence scale is not consistent. As others have shown, the OPM equivalence scale also did not have a scientific basis either (Brady 2009; Katz 1989; O'Connor 2001) . Hence, as Appendix I shows, the OPM thresholds for deep poverty are lower than 20% of the national median. 
